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Personality and Neuropsychology
Personality research is usually perceived as lying towards the “softer” end of
psychological inquiry, seemingly far from the “harder” neural mechanisms, processes, and
neurological lesions which are the daily stuff of neuropsychology. As biologically-oriented
personality psychologists, however, we have always tried to couch our proposals in brain-
behavioural terms and have even offered suggestions as to the “neuropsychology” of
personality traits such as anxiety and their related clinical conditions (e.g., Gray, 1982).
Furthermore, several other personality theorists have also drawn from the rich materials of
behavioural neuroscience (e.g., Cloninger, Svracik, & Przybeck, 1993; Depue & Collins,
1999; Zuckerman, 1991). In this chapter we continue to apply our neuropsychological
approach to personality: specifically focusing on the effects of personality traits on learning
tasks.
The usual reaction of our more traditional neuropsychology colleagues is to express a
varying degree of scepticism about any attempt to explore the neuropsychology of
personality. It is therefore perhaps worth reflecting at the start of this chapter on the possible
reasons for such a reaction.
One possible concern is that of severity. The subjects who participate in a personality
study are healthy after all and so it might be expected that the range of variation of brain
functioning that they would display would be relatively small. There are many studies of the
effects of personality on cognitive task performance, for example those focusing on trait
anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). These studies show that significant personality-task correlations
can be readily obtained. Furthermore, we believe that new neuroscience methods will enable
researchers to illuminate the neurobiological bases of these differences between individuals.
Another concern, which is potentially more serious, is that of specificity.
Neuropsychology traditionally attempts to detect relationships between specific brain
functions and the specific brain structures that are damaged in the patients being studied.
Personality traits, even when they have a strong biological basis, may reflect mechanisms
that are distributed over a wide neural network of structures (e.g., Gray, 1982; Depue &
Collins, 1999; Johnson et al, 1999). However, the idea that specific brain structures may act
more or less independently, and that the corresponding psychological functions may be
empirically isolated, is an oversimplification that does not reflect the richly interconnected
nature of the brain. In keeping with this, there has been a detectable shift away from notions
of strict localisation of function in contemporary neuropsychology. This trend has been
encouraged by connectionist models, which have emphasised distributed processing (e.g.,
Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986), and by the often widely dispersed patterns of neural
activation revealed by functional neuroimaging studies (see Posner & Raichle, 1994).
A final area of disquiet probably stems from distrust of the self-report questionnaires
used to measure personality traits and of “correlational” research in general. Careful
psychometric development ensures that, whatever entities are measured by personality
questionnaires, they are measured reliably. No-one’s research exemplifies the careful
approach to the construction and validation of personality measurement instruments, across
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several decades, more than that of Jan Strelau (e.g., De Pascalis, Zawadzki, & Strelau, 2000;
Friedensberg & Strelau, 1982; Newman, Clark, Crawford, & Strelau, 1997; Strelau,
Angleitner, Bantelmann, & Ruch, 1990; Strelau & Zawadzki, 1995). Personality researchers,
who aspire to biological, reductionist explanations of the traits in question, should remember
that their neuropsychological investigations of personality can be only as good as the
instruments with which they measure their primary constructs. Researchers like us, who
have contributed little to the development of specific personality instruments, therefore owe
a considerable debt to the careful psychometric groundwork by people like Strelau and
Eysenck.
As a result of this kind of careful instrument development, there is currently a certain
“bullishness” amongst researchers about the status of personality traits and their
measurement (e.g., Matthews & Deary, 1998). Moreover, finding correlations with cognitive
task performance is not self-fulfilling or circular, as the questionnaires only very rarely
contain items which directly ask the subject to rate their own cognitive abilities. Finally, it
should be recalled that traditional neuropsychology, and the currently highly popular
techniques of functional neuroimaging, are also correlational methods. In these cases the
experimenter records either the cognitive deficits which correlate with the presence or
absence of a particular lesion, or records the neural activations which correlate with the tasks
undertaken in the scanner.
In view of the above points we would argue that there is little reason for
neuropsychologists to be so sceptical about, or hostile to, the use of personality studies to
understand human cognition. There are also some advantages to this approach. A major issue
for neuropsychological research arises from the need to demonstrate specific deficits.
Patients often show widespread deficits across tasks, particularly when one is studying
groups with neurodegenerative (e.g., Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s disease) or
neuropsychiatric conditions (e.g., schizophrenia). The research has to disentangle a proposed
specific deficit on a particular task, which can be linked to specific brain pathology, from
generalised problems on other tasks that cannot be linked, in a straightforward way, to
particular brain structures. These generalised problems may arise from a host of other
factors: psychoactive medication; hospitalisation and ensuing institutionalisation; diffuse
cortical atrophy etc. etc. Most, if not all, of these generalised problems will be absent in the
healthy subjects who would participate in a personality study, and so it may be more easily
possible to see any specific deficit in such studies (Claridge, 1987; Patterson & Newman,
1993; Pickering & Gray, 1999).
Bearing in mind the above discussion, this chapter will begin a neuropsychological
analysis of mechanisms through which individual differences in personality might influence
some kinds of human learning. In addition we will suggest that these mechanisms may have
a biological basis in factors affecting dopaminergic neurotransmission. We will therefore
begin to enhance our analysis by constructing biologically-constrained neural network
models of some of the processes concerned.
Possible Personality-Sensitive Processes Affecting Learning
To pre-empt what will follow we are going to suggest that certain forms of human
learning, involving the formation of new associations between stimuli and responses, are
ripe for study within an individual differences framework. Such stimulus-response (S-R), or
habit, learning is currently the focus of considerable neuropsychological interest (e.g.,
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Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998) and we hope that an input from
individual differences research in this area will provide further insights.
In particular we will consider two processes affecting S-R learning that may be reliably
affected by personality trait variation. First, and in most detail, we will stress the (subject’s
reaction to the) reinforcement which follows a response (using ideas from reinforcement
sensitivity theory; Gray, 1970; Gray, 1981; Pickering, Corr, Powell, Kumari, Thornton, &
Gray, 1997). Second, we will stress (individual differences in) the processes by which a
stimulus feature is deemed salient (Gray, Kumari, Lawrence, & Young, 1999; Schmajuk,
Buhusi, & Gray, 1998). An ability to detect and attend to salient stimuli may be particularly
relevant in S-R learning tasks in which the subject has to learn which stimulus features are
predictive of the responses required, and learn to distinguish them from other stimulus
features that are not predictive.
Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory: Neurophysiological and Theoretical Considerations
Reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) is an account of fundamental human personality
traits in terms of individual differences in the sensitivity/reactivity of basic brain-behavioural
systems that respond to reinforcing (and other) stimuli. The details of the theory, and the
empirical evidence that has accumulated from attempts to test it, have been described over
the last three decades (Corr, 2001; Gray, 1970, 1981, 1982; Matthews & Gilliland, 1999;
Pickering, Díaz, & Gray, 1995; Pickering et al, 1997; Pickering & Gray, 1999). We will
reprise only those parts that are relevant for the current chapter.
One of the basic systems discussed in RST is known as the behavioural activation system
(BAS). It is suggested that the BAS responds to specific inputs; in particular, stimuli
associated with reward. When a person’s BAS is activated by these specific inputs there are
motivational consequences: the arousal of the person increases, energising any ongoing
approach behaviour, and this might commonly be seen when the person is involved in
approach behaviour towards the BAS-activating stimulus itself. For the purposes of this
chapter we will emphasise the reinforcing consequences of BAS activation below: that is,
the consequences for the learning of a response when that response has the effect of eliciting
a BAS-activating stimulus from the environment (i.e., when a response leads to BAS
activation). The personality component of the theory simply proposes that the biological
basis of a fundamental personality dimension corresponds to inter-individual variations in
the sensitivity/reactivity of the BAS to those stimuli which activate it. For the moment, we
shall refer to the personality dimension concerned as the “BAS-related” trait; later in the
chapter we shall consider what this trait may actually be. It is suggested, therefore, that
subjects who have high levels of the BAS-related personality trait have a highly responsive
BAS, and they are predicted to experience stronger motivational and reinforcing
consequences of BAS activation than subjects with lower levels of the BAS-related trait. We
have suggested (e.g., Gray, 1987b; Pickering & Gray, 1999) that the BAS is located, in part,
within brain regions that are richly innervated by ascending dopaminergic projections; thus,
the biological basis of the BAS-related trait is proposed to be partly dopaminergic. Other
personality theorists have proposed fundamental personality traits based on the functioning
of an explicitly BAS-like system (e.g., Cloninger et al, 1993; Depue & Collins, 1999;
Zuckerman, 1991), and they have each stressed that the biological basis of such traits is
likely to involve variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission. An area of disagreement (see
below) centres over precisely which of the major personality dimensions (and their
associated measurement instruments) offers the best characterisation for the BAS-related
personality trait.
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Two aspects of the original BAS formulation are worthy of note because we are going to
suggest that they may need revision. First, we will consider the proposal that BAS-activating
stimuli are stimuli associated with reward, along with the associated notion that the BAS is
not activated by primary rewards themselves. It has been noted in the literature for some
time that this aspect may have led to confusion (e.g., Zinbarg & Revelle, 1989, p. 304). In
fact, cell recording studies in monkeys have shown that dopaminergic cells fire phasically in
response both to primary rewards (e.g., an unsignalled drop of fruit juice placed into the
animal’s mouth) and to conditioned visual or auditory stimuli that have become valid
predictors of reward. After learning has established the conditioned stimulus as a reward-
predictor, the primary reward no longer elicits phasic firing in the dopaminergic cell (see
Brown, Bullock, & Grossberg, 1999, and Schultz, Romo, Ljungberg, Mirenowicz,
Hollerman, & Dickinson, 1995, for details and references).
In relation to these findings, it did not matter whether the dopaminergic cells being
recorded from were located in the substantia nigra (such cells project predominantly to the
dorsal striatum, i.e. the caudate or putamen), or were located in the ventral tegmental area
(such cells project to a wide range of structures, but within the striatum they project
predominantly to ventral targets, i.e. to the nucleus accumbens). These dopamine (DA)
projection pathways are referred to as the nigrostriatal and mesolimbic DA systems
respectively1. If firing of the ascending nigrostriatal or mesolimbic DA projection cells
represents a key part of BAS functioning, as is widely supposed, then it seems likely that the
BAS will respond both to primary rewards and stimuli associated with these rewards
(although perhaps at different stages of learning).
A second issue to consider is the proposal that the BAS controls an individual’s response
to a stimulus associated with reward, but is not involved in the conditioning processes by
which the stimulus became associated with the reward in the first place. We have counselled
for some time that this distinction is a grey area within RST (Gray, 1987a) and have noted
elsewhere that some data indicate an influence of potentially BAS-related personality traits
on the conditioning process itself (see the discussion of the study by Corr, Pickering, &
Gray, 1995, in Pickering et al, 1997). Zinbarg and Mohlman (1998) have responded to the
uncertainties over this point by distinguishing between the standard (“motivational”) version
of RST and an “associative” version in which BAS-related personality traits are predicted to
correlate with the strength of the association formed between a conditioned stimulus and a
reward.
The recording data from DA cells, noted earlier, also speak to this second issue.
However, some detailed background must be explored first in order to make the point. There
are now quite a large number of similar computational models that attempt to simulate the
DA cell recording data (e.g., Brown et al, 1999; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995; Salum,
Roque Da Silva, & Pickering, 1999; Brown et al, 1999, also review a number of other
models). A common feature of the models is the use of a so-called “three-factor” learning
rule to describe the long-term modifications of synapses that underpin learning. The three-
factor rule is so named because it proposes that three separate components are necessary for
synaptic modification to occur. Let us consider this learning rule specifically in relation to
the synapses which form the junction between cortical input terminals and the dendritic
spines of the striatal neurons receiving those inputs. Synaptic strengthening is proposed to
occur only when: (i) the presynaptic terminal from the cortical input is activated; (ii) the
                                                            
1 In this chapter we shall often refer generically to striatal neurons. This term is meant to cover neurons in both
the dorsal striatum (e.g., in the caudate and putamen, often referred to as the neostriatum) and ventral
striatum (e.g., in the nucleus accumbens).
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postsynaptic striatal neuron is strongly depolarised (i.e. beyond the threshold for this cell to
fire); and (iii) an appropriately-timed reinforcement signal has arrived at the synapse. It is
widely suggested that the mesolimbic and nigrostriatal DA projections (i.e., those projecting
to the striatum and other brain regions) carry the reinforcement signal.
Wickens and Kotter (1995), in an excellent review, summarise much of the relevant
information: the evidence implicating mesolimbic/nigrostriatal DA neurons in reinforcement
mechanisms; the theoretical development of the three-factor rule and its utility in explaining
reinforcement processes; and the electrophysiological evidence concerning the role of DA in
synaptic plasticity in the striatum. Finally, Wickens and Kotter propose a specific set of
neurophysiological mechanisms by which the firing of mesolimbic/nigrostriatal DA cells
may act as a reinforcement signal within the three-factor learning rule framework. The full
details are beyond the scope of this chapter and so only a brief summary is given here.
A critical component is the binding of DA at a specific subtype of postsynaptic DA
receptor (the D-1 subtype), located on the dendritic spines of striatal neurons. Binding at
these receptors is driven by phasic bursts of firing in the ascending DA cells (and recall that
just these phasic bursts of firing occur in response to rewards, or to conditioned stimuli
associated with reward). These dopaminergic events (factor three of the three-factor rule)
interact with processes occurring at other synapses located on the same dendritic spines of
the striatal neurons (specifically the corticostriatal synapses at the junctions between
terminals of cortical input neurons and the striatal dendritic spines). Firing of the cortical
neurons (factor one) releases glutamate at these corticostriatal synapses and this binds at
postsynaptic N-methyl-D-aspartic acid (NMDA) receptors on the dendritic spines. This
NMDA receptor activation leads to depolarisation of the striatal cell (factor two) and an
increase in calcium concentration within the dendritic spine. The interaction between these
DA- and glutamate-activated processes is proposed to lead to a long-term strengthening (or
“potentiation”) of the corticostriatal synapses.
Finally, it is suggested that if the glutamate-activated processes occur (factors one and
two) but are not followed, at the appropriate time, by DA cell firing (and the associated
changes at striatal dendritic spines; factor three), then the corticostriatal synapses may
undergo long-term weakening (or “depression”). These mechanisms of synaptic potentiation
and depression will play a role in the computer simulations of learning presented later.
How does all the above discussion of the neurophysiology of synaptic modification in
the striatum relate to RST, and in particular to the question of whether the BAS may play a
role in the formation of reward-based associations? The various computational models of
DA cell firing, noted above, suppose that the DA cells, in the substantia nigra pars compacta
(SNc) and ventral tegmental area (VTA), are activated by primary rewards. Brown et al
(1999) provide the most specific account (see Figure 1).
Brown et al suggest that primary reward signals arise initially in the lateral
hypothalamus, and the resulting hypothalamic output activates both the ventral striatum and
the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (PPTN). The PPTN is also indirectly activated by
outputs from the ventral striatum: these outputs inhibit the ventral pallidum and thereby
disinhibit the PPTN. The PPTN then projects to the SNc and there produces an increase in
DA cell firing. However, the DA cells project to both dorsal and ventral parts of the striatum.
Brown et al further propose that, in the ventral striatum, the resulting DA release acts as a
reinforcement signal that allows the conditioning of sensory stimuli associated with the
occurrence of reward. Specifically, they propose that cortical neurons, processing the
sensory stimuli, synapse onto the dendritic spines of the ventral striatal neurons, and these
corticostriatal synapses are strengthened (by the mechanisms suggested by Wickens &
Kotter, 1995) when DA firing in the SNc is triggered by a primary reward. In this way the
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conditioned stimulus, by itself, becomes able to activate the ventral striatal neuron and then,
via the ventral striatum -> ventral pallidum -> PPTN -> SNc pathway, can elicit conditioned
firing of the DA cells in the SNc.
Figure 1:
A box diagram showing some of the neural components of the model by Brown et al (1999).
The dotted arrow shows the dopaminergic projections to ventral striatum. All the pathways
shown by solid continuous arrows are excitatory. The projection from ventral striatum to
PPTN is depicted as non-continuous to reflect the fact that the pathway inhibits neural
activity in the ventral pallidum thereby reducing the tonic pallidal inhibition of PPTN. The
round arrowhead in the pathway from cortex to ventral striatum indicates a set of modifiable
synapses. Abbreviations: DA dopamine; SNc substantia nigra pars compacta; LH lateral
hypothalamus; PPTN pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus.
In summary, then, the DA cells which are activated by primary rewards are also involved
in the strengthening of the neural pathways that enable these same cells to respond to
conditioned reward stimuli. If the functioning of the BAS depends on the firing of these DA
cells, as is widely supposed, then variations in the functioning of the BAS across individuals
should influence the extent to which stimuli become associated with rewards.
A simple speculation as to how BAS functioning may vary across individuals would be
to suggest that there is variation in the number and/or functioning of the D-1 DA receptors
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on the dendritic spines of the striatal neurons. As already outlined, these receptors are widely
believed to be responsible for the reinforcement function of the ascending DA projection
systems. Therefore, high BAS reactivity might result from greater numbers, and/or increased
DA-binding affinity, in these receptors. Genotypic variations in D-1 DA receptor structure
have been identified (e.g., Cichon, Nothen, Erdmann, & Propping, 1994), and these
polymorphisms have been found to be linked to potentially BAS-related behaviours such as
smoking and gambling (Comings et al, 1997). The structural differences caused by D-1 DA
receptor polymorphisms could alter receptor functioning, thereby potentially leading to the
genetic variations in an individual’s sensitivity to positive reinforcers.
Of course, there are several other components in the dopaminergic systems, underlying
BAS function, which may show functional variation across individuals. For example, the
DA cells themselves might be more reactive to their incoming inputs (from the PPTN,
according to Brown et al’s model), in high BAS trait, relative to low BAS trait, individuals.
High BAS reactivity would then be manifest as a more intense DA cell firing in response to
primary or secondary positive reinforcers. This increased firing could potentially boost
positive reinforcement effects, through elevating the level of DA binding to the postsynaptic
D-1 DA receptors. In terms of reinforcing consequences the end result could therefore be the
same as that which might be produced by increased numbers, or increased binding potential,
of the D-1 DA receptors themselves.
Predictions from RST about the Reinforcing Effects of BAS Activation
The previous section argued that the BAS is activated both by stimuli associated with
rewards, and by rewards themselves. These stimuli are referred to as secondary and primary
positive (or appetitive) reinforcers, respectively. This explains why the general theory is
referred to as “Reinforcement” Sensitivity Theory. By definition, positive reinforcers
increase the probability of any response upon which they are contingent (Gray, 1975). If a
hungry animal’s response is followed by a food reward (or a tone previously paired with
food), then it will be more likely to emit that response again under similar circumstances. If
a young child chooses to share his or her toy with a friend, and this action is followed by an
approving smile from a parent, then the child will be more likely to share his/her toys in
future. The change in behaviour represents learning under positive reinforcement.
As we have seen, RST is concerned with individual differences in the reactivity/
sensitivity of the BAS to positive reinforcers. It follows, therefore, that the learning of highly
BAS-reactive individuals should be more strongly affected by positive reinforcements given
during learning than would the learning of individuals with a less reactive BAS. The natural
expectation is therefore that, the more BAS-reactive an individual is, the more quickly and
strongly they should learn associations under conditions of positive reinforcement. This is a
basic prediction of RST: the higher an individual’s level of the BAS-related personality trait,
the better they should learn under positive reinforcement. In the literature, this prediction has
been tested a number of times, with very modest success, as we shall see below. The
computer modelling work presented later casts light on why evidence in support of this basic
prediction of RST may have proved so elusive. Before considering the past studies, however,
we must address the issue that we have so far sidestepped: what personality factor
corresponds to the BAS-related personality trait?
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Characterising the BAS-Related Personality Trait
The original presentation of RST (Gray, 1970) suggested that neurotic extraverts were
more “susceptible to reward” than stable introverts. In terms of the terminology of this
chapter, this means that the BAS-related personality trait was considered to be a combination
of neuroticism and extraversion. Note that, from the outset, the theory proposed an additive
combination of extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N), with a greater weighting for E than for
N2. Our position on this question has evolved: we proposed that the BAS-related trait might
also contain a contribution from Eysenck’s Psychoticism (P) scale (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1975b), with the high end of the P factor relating to high BAS-reactivity (Gray, 1987b), and
we have also suggested that the weighting of the contribution from N might be effectively
zero (e.g., Díaz & Pickering, 1993). In terms of a single verbal label for the BAS-related
trait, we originally proposed that impulsivity or trait impulsiveness might well capture the
dimension running from stable introverts (at the low end) to neurotic extraverts (at the high
end). However, psychometric measures of impulsiveness (a tendency to act quickly without
deliberating) tend to show high correlations with other traits such as sensation seeking, and
antisocial or nonconformist tendencies. All these elements are present, to some extent,
within the items that comprise Eysenck’s P scale. In light of this we suggested recently
(Pickering & Gray, 1999) that impulsive sensation seeking might be a better label for the
BAS-related trait. However, to reflect the antisocial characteristics we shall, in this chapter,
adopt the term impulsive antisocial sensation seeking (ImpASS) as a working label for the
BAS-related personality dimension. Of course, this characterisation may be wrong, and only
some elements of the ImpASS cluster of traits may relate to BAS functioning. Our view is
that this is a matter to be determined empirically, once behavioural correlates of BAS
functioning, which are reliably associated with personality measures, can be established.
The position just outlined is broadly in line with that of some other theorists who have
proposed a personality dimension based on the inter-individual functional variations of a
BAS-like system (e.g., Cloninger et al, 1993; Zuckerman, 1991). However, other theorists,
who propose a BAS-based personality trait, argue that extraversion is a better label for the
dimension (e.g., Depue & Collins, 1999).
The issue is complicated because there is a wide range of self-report questionnaires that
are used to measure these personality dimensions and their constituent facets, and the
measures tend to be positively correlated (see Table 1 for the widely-used ImpASS and E
scales that are mentioned in this chapter; Depue & Collins, 1999, give a much fuller list of E
scales). Depue and Collins graphically depicted the relationship between E and ImpASS
measures, as revealed by multivariate statistical techniques, and this revealed that E and
ImpASS measures tend to lie at 45º to one another, although the angle may grow towards
90º for ImpASS measures with a more pronounced antisocial component.
Depue and Collins (1999) recently developed their case by arguing that the E dimension
was directly related to markers of dopaminergic neurotransmission, as one would predict for
a BAS-related trait. In addition they suggested that ImpASS measures can sometimes be
found to be correlated with DA markers, but only because ImpASS measures can stand as
proxies for the E dimension (with which, as already noted, they correlate). Depue and
Collins concluded that associations between E and DA markers should be stronger, and
reported more consistently in the literature, than the associations between ImpASS and DA
                                                            
2 Some authors appear to have been confused into believing that we were proposing a multiplicative
combination. A multiplicative relationship is more in line with the related, but distinct, position adopted by
Newman and his colleagues (see Pickering, Corr, & Gray, 1999, for a discussion).
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markers, if E were reflecting variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission more directly
than ImpASS. They claimed that the literature showed just such a pattern of inter-
relationships.
Table 1:
Some examples of widely-used measures of Extraversion and Impulsive Antisocial
Sensation Seeking (ImpASS) personality traits.
Measures of Extraversion
Scale Originator(s) Inventory
Extraversion Eysenck Eysenck Personality
Inventory/Questionnaire
(EPI/EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975a;b)
Extraversion Costa and
McCrae
Neuroticism Extraversion Openness
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI; Costa &
McCrae, 1992)
Positive Emotionality Tellegen and
Waller
Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen, 1982;
Tellegen & Waller, 1992)
Measures of ImpASS
Scale Originator Inventory
Novelty Seeking Cloninger Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire
(TPQ; Cloninger, 1989)
P Scale Eysenck EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975b)
Impulsiveness and
Venturesomeness
Eysenck The I7-Impulsiveness Scale
(S.B.G.Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, &
Allsop, 1985b)
Sensation
Seeking Scale
Zuckerman Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS; Zuckerman,
1979)
Behavioral Activation
System Scale
Carver and
White
Behavioral Inhibition System and
Behavioral Activation System (BIS-BAS)
Scales (Carver & White, 1994)
By contrast, we would argue that, taking the published data in the round, there is no clear
indication that DA-E relationships are stronger, or more consistently obtained, than DA-
ImpASS relationships. To emphasise this, we begin by noting some of the reported
relationships between DA and ImpASS measures, before considering evidence for
dopaminergic involvement in E.
Clinicians have anecdotally observed an association between Parkinson’s disease and
personality characteristics at the low pole of the ImpASS dimension (i.e., stoicism,
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industriousness, and inflexibility), after the onset of symptoms. The anecdotal observations
also extend, more interestingly, to reports of premorbid personality from the patient or
spouse. Menza and colleagues (Menza, Forman, Goldstein, & Golbe, 1990; Menza, Golbe,
Cody, & Forman, 1993) have documented low levels of Cloninger’s Novelty Seeking scale
(Cloninger, 1989) in Parkinson’s disease patients, and have argued that damage to the
mesolimbic dopaminergic system in Parkinson’s disease is responsible for the patients’
characteristic (low ImpASS) personality profile.
There have been a few neuroimaging studies which cast light on the biological basis of
ImpASS personality traits. In our laboratory, a single photon emission tomography (SPET)
study in a small group of healthy volunteers (N.S.Gray, Pickering, & Gray, 1994) used a
specific radioligand for dopamine D2 receptors (123I-IBZM). We correlated the left and right
hemisphere measures of ligand binding in the striatum with scores on the EPQ. We found
significant negative correlations between the P scale from the EPQ (EPQ-P; Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975b) and the D2 binding index in each hemisphere, but no significant
associations with other personality measures from the EPQ, including extraversion (EPQ-E).
The binding index, lower in subjects with high EPQ-P scores, probably indexes D2 receptor
density. However, it is possible that there may have been compensatory up-regulation of
receptor sensitivity in subjects with a reduced number of receptors, so dopaminergic activity
at individual synapses in such subjects may be enhanced.
A research group in Sweden (Farde, Gustavsson, & Jönsson, 1997) has independently
reported on the personality correlates of D2 receptor binding in a larger group of healthy
volunteers. Receptor density (in right and left striatum combined) was measured using
positron emission tomography (PET) with a different radioligand, and personality was
assessed via the Karolinska Scales of Personality (KSP). Significant negative correlations
were obtained for the dimensions of detachment and irritability, which index some aspects of
the ImpASS personality dimension. (Note that it might equally well be argued that these
scales relate inversely to aspects of E.) The correlations with other scales from the KSP were
noted to be non-significant (after correction for multiple comparisons), but were not reported
in detail. It would have been particularly interesting to know the size of the relationships
between D2 receptor binding and the impulsiveness and monotony avoidance scales of the
KSP, as these measure other aspects of ImpASS personality.
A further PET study in a small group of Parkinson’s disease patients (Menza, Mark,
Burn, & Brooks, 1995) looked at the relationship between Cloninger’s Novelty Seeking and
striatal uptake of [18F]dopa. Uptake of the ligand in the left caudate, but not other measured
regions, was significantly correlated with Novelty Seeking. These workers related these
findings to their earlier studies (Menza et al, 1990; 1993), which had showed low levels of
Novelty Seeking in Parkinson’s disease patients.
In recent years, the first evidence has begun to emerge, in human personality research, of
an association between scores on a specific personality index and structural variations in the
subjects’ DNA (e.g., Benjamin et al, 1996; Ebstein et al, 1996). This research is germane to
the present chapter as the index concerned (Cloninger’s Novelty Seeking) measures ImpASS
personality traits, and the gene with which it was associated codes for a subtype of the
dopamine receptor (the D-4 subtype).
The dopamine D-4 receptor (DRD4) marker consists of alleles with from 2 to 8 repeats
of a 48 base-pair sequence in exon III of the gene on chromosome 11 that codes for the
dopamine D-4 receptor. The number of repeats changes the length of the third cytoplasmic
loop of the receptor. Various in vitro studies (e.g., Asghari et al, 1994) have shown that the
shorter alleles (2 to 5 repeats) code for a receptor that is somewhat more efficient in binding
dopamine than the larger alleles (6 to 8 repeats). For this reason, DRD4 genotypes have
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usually been analysed by comparing individuals who have two short alleles (about two-
thirds of genotypes) versus those with one or two long alleles (one-third of genotypes).
In the original studies, individuals with at least one long-repeat DRD4 allele showed
significantly higher Novelty Seeking scores than individuals without a long-repeat allele.
The other three Cloninger temperament scales (Reward Dependence, Persistence, Harm
Avoidance; Cloninger et al, 1993) showed no significant differences between the two
groups. These associations have subsequently been investigated in a large number of studies.
Although these subsequent reports have produced mixed results (see Plomin & Caspi, 1999,
for a partial review), the overall pattern seems to indicate a link between DA receptor
structure and ImpASS personality traits, particularly those measured by the Novelty Seeking
scale. It should be noted that Benjamin et al (1996) actually found a significant association
between DRD4 allele type and scores on both E and Conscientiousness (measured using the
NEO Personality Inventory; Costa & McCrae, 1992). The relationship between DRD4
alleles and Novelty Seeking was based on subjects’ predicted Novelty Seeking scores,
calculated using a regression equation with the NEO scores as predictors. Clearly, the
association with E fits with Depue and Collins’ position, but the association with
Conscientiousness (which is inversely related to ImpASS, but unrelated to E) does not.
Psychological and physiological responses to dopaminergic drug challenges, as a
function of personality scores, offer further insights. Netter, Hennig, and Roed (1996) tested
male smokers in a placebo-controlled design after they had abstained from smoking for 2.5
hours. When the subjects had been given a dopamine agonist (lisuride), or dopamine
anatgonist (fluphenazine), drug-induced effects on prolactin secretion were observed. These
effects were not mediated by either of two ImpASS measures used (the Disinhibition and
Experience Seeking [ES] subscales from Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale). However,
other effects were mediated by ImpASS traits. Relative to placebo treatment, cigarette
craving increased under lisuride for high ES subjects but was reduced under the same drug
for low ES subjects. General wellbeing was increased after fluphenazine, and decreased after
lisuride, to a significantly greater extent for high ES subjects than for low ES subjects.
Corr and Kumari (2000) looked at the mood-inducing effects of amphetamine as a
function of two measures of ImpASS (Cloninger’s Novelty Seeking scale and Eysenck’s P
scale), along with Eysenck’s Extraversion scale. In a double-blind, placebo-controlled
design, there were no mediating effects of E or Novelty-Seeking on the mood changes (in
energetic arousal, tense arousal and hedonic tone) which they measured. In the placebo-
treated groups, energetic arousal and hedonic tone increased, while tense arousal decreased,
with increasing P scores. These personality-mediated effects in the placebo-treated subjects
(presumably due to anticipation of drug effects) were significantly weaker in the
amphetamine-treated groups.
The evidence just presented makes a moderately strong case that ImpASS personality
measures are associated with variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission and, in some
cases (N.S.Gray et al, 1994; Corr & Kumari, 2000), measures of E did not show a similar
association. Depue and Collins’ evidence comes from their own studies: this work also
investigates the personality variables which mediate the psychophysiological effects induced
by dopaminergic drug challenges. Their results tend to demonstrate associations with
measures of E rather than with measures of ImpASS.
In the first study, Depue, Luciana, Arbisi, Collins, & Leon (1994) studied a sample of 11
healthy women. They correlated personality scores (from the Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire; Tellegen & Waller, 1992) against two psychophysiological indices that
respond to a dopamine agonist challenge (they used the drug bromocriptine). The
psychophysiological indices (measures of prolactin secretion and spontaneous blink rate)
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were positively, significantly, and strongly associated with Positive Emotionality (a measure
of extraversion) but not with Constraint or Negative Emotionality. Their findings were
replicated in a larger study of 80 healthy young male and female subjects, which used a
randomised crossover, double-blind protocol (see Depue, 1995; 1996; Depue & Collins,
1999). The association between prolactin secretion and Positive Emotionality was again
strong and positive, although the positive relationship with Eysenck’s E scale (EPQ-E) was a
non-significant trend, and was slightly weaker than the (non-significant negative) association
observed for the P scale. In line with the findings of Netter et al (1996), other measures of
ImpASS (e.g., those from Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking scale) generally did not correlate
with prolactin secretion, although those with a positive affective component (e.g., Eysenck’s
Venturesomeness scale; S.B.G.Eysenck et al, 1985b) did show a modest but significant
positive correlation.
In summarising this evidence, we reiterate our earlier point: it seems premature to
conclude that measures of E are more strongly and/or more consistently associated with DA
functioning than measures of ImpASS. The discrepancies between the findings of Depue’s
group, and the other findings reviewed above, may have arisen because Depue and
colleagues have typically used a different measure of E (Positive Emotionality rather than
EPQ-E). The most convincing associations with ImpASS may be those involving the EPQ-P
(which just failed to reach significance in Depue’s research, with the correlation being in the
opposite direction to that for Positive Emotionality). These data raise the possibility that
there may be more than one personality factor that is associated with variations in
dopaminergic neurotransmission.
Past Studies of BAS-Mediated Personality Effects on Learning
We have previously described an idealised experiment for testing for RST’s personality
predictions relating to the motivational consequences of BAS activation, and argued that few
published studies have come close to satisfying the conditions needed to test RST adequately
(Pickering et al, 1997). In this section we will carry out a similar exercise for RST’s
predictions relating to the reinforcing consequences of BAS activation.
For an idealised reinforcement experiment several conditions must be met. First, the
relevant personality traits must be measured. In light of the controversy regarding the true
nature of the BAS-related personality trait (see above) the study should include measures of
extraversion or impulsive antisocial sensation seeking (or both). Second, in order to explore
personality associations with reinforcement effects, the dependent variable must index
learning rather than general task performance or psychomotor speed (which is more likely to
be affected by motivational processes). Third, although reinforcement effects are
traditionally considered to apply to operant conditioning paradigms, this chapter argued
earlier that (the associative version of) RST can also make predictions for the influence of
the BAS-related personality trait on the formation of associations between conditioned
stimuli and rewards (i.e., the BAS may affect classical conditioning as well). Therefore,
studies need not be restricted to operant procedures.
Fourth, the prevailing reinforcement context must be exclusively (or predominantly)
rewarding. The reason for this stems from the (mutually) inhibitory interactions between the
BAS and another brain-behavioural system (the behavioural inhibition system, or BIS)
proposed in RST. The BIS is thought to be activated by stimuli associated with punishment
and therefore may be active in tasks where punishing reinforcers are delivered. The BIS and
BAS can be thought of as competing for exclusive control over behaviour, and we have
shown that interactions between these systems, when both are activated, can considerably
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complicate the behavioural predictions made by RST (see Pickering, 1997). In essence, this
means that, in learning experiments with both punishments and rewards (rather than rewards
alone), we cannot be sure which system will predominate for any given individual.
Therefore, to study the effects of the BAS one needs an experiment in which the only
explicit reinforcers are rewarding. We should keep in mind these conditions when reviewing
the main published studies below.
One major series of studies (carried out in India by combinations of B.S.Gupta, U.Gupta,
& S.Gupta) used a verbal operant conditioning procedure (see S.Gupta, 1990, for a review).
The study by S.Gupta (1990) is typical. Subjects had to generate sentences using one of five
pronouns (I; We; He; They; or You) and a series of specific verbs typed onto cards. The first
20 cards provided a baseline for the rate of use of “I” and “We” pronouns. For the next 60
cards (the conditioning phase) the experimenter reinforced the use of the “I” and “We”
pronouns but offered no reinforcement or feedback of any kind for the other pronouns. For
subjects in the positive reinforcement condition the experimenter said “good” to their
responses that included the target pronouns and, for subjects in the punishment condition,
said “poor” to responses including the target pronouns. A post-test phase on a further 20
cards allowed an index of learning to be computed. The change in “I” and “We” usage,
produced by the conditioning phase, was measured by subtracting the number of target
responses produced in the baseline from the number produced in the post-test phase.
Three groups of subjects varying in impulsivity were tested in the positive reinforcement
condition, and three matched groups were tested in the punishment condition. The subjects
were drawn from a very large sample, and were selected because they had high, medium, or
low scorers on the Hindi version of the Eysenck Personality Inventory. Six further groups of
20 subjects (high, medium, or low sociability crossed with the two reinforcement conditions)
were selected on the basis of their sociability scores from the same personality inventory.
In the positive reinforcement condition, subjects with high impulsivity scores showed
more learning (i.e., a bigger increase from baseline to post-test in use of the reinforced
pronouns) than subjects with either medium or low impulsivity scores. The same pattern was
found for sociability. However, the study also revealed significant decreases in the use of the
reinforced pronouns (between baseline and post-test) for subjects in the punishment
condition. This effect was greater for subjects in the low impulsivity group, than for subjects
with either medium or high impulsivity scores. (Learning in the punishment condition did
not vary as a function of sociability scores.) Thus, impulsivity and sociability (extraversion)
measures did appear to mediate operant conditioning under positive verbal reinforcement,
but impulsivity also mediated conditioning under punishing verbal reinforcement. The latter
effect is not predicted by RST. Furthermore, when our group tried to replicate these effects
with subjects in London, we were unsuccessful (Hernaiz-Sanders, 1991).
Another important series of studies used variants of a go/no-go discrimination learning
paradigm. The typical design involved presenting subjects with items drawn from a small set
of between 8 and 12 randomly selected two digit numbers, with half being randomly
designated as targets (to which the subject should respond; i.e. go items) and the remainder
serving as distractors (to which the subject should not respond; i.e. no-go items). Typically,
separate analyses have been conducted using the numbers of omission errors for targets, and
the numbers of false positives made to distractors. Most of these studies have been carried
out using so-called “mixed incentive” conditions, in which the correct responses to targets
are rewarded and false positive responses to distractors are punished. This approach has been
adopted because mixed-incentive conditions are most pertinent to the theory of disinhibition
advanced by Newman and his colleagues (see Patterson & Newman, 1993).
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For the reasons noted earlier, mixed-incentive conditions are not ideal for testing
predictions based on RST. One study (Hagopian & Ollendick, 1994) did test a reward-only
condition in which correct responses to targets were rewarded with auditory feedback and a
10-point increase in the subject’s score, displayed on the screen. False positives received no
reinforcement and neither did correct rejections of distractors, or omission errors made to
targets. Hagopian and Ollendick also tested subjects under a mixed-incentive condition, in
which punishment of false positives (loss of points) was used in addition to the rewards for
correct responses. (Hagopian and Ollendick distinguished these conditions in terms of what
reinforcement was applied to the false positives, with the results that the reward-only
condition was confusingly referred to as “non-reward”, and the mixed-incentive condition
was referred to as “punishment”.)
Unfortunately, Hagopian and Ollendick did not test for the effects of possible BAS-
related personality traits, but looked instead at the effects of differences in anxiety. RST
specifically predicts that anxiety relates to the functioning of the BIS, rather than the BAS.
As such, anxiety should not affect learning under the predominantly positive reinforcement
conditions prevailing in Hagopian and Ollendick’s non-reward condition. However, they
reported that low anxiety subjects made significantly more responses overall, and made
significantly more false positives, than high anxiety subjects. By finding a significant
personality effect that is specifically predicted by RST not to occur, then this result appears
to contribute to the lack of fit between data and theory (rather like S.Gupta’s significant
effects of impulsivity on learning under punishment reinforcement).
However, there are reasons to suppose that the high and low anxiety groups in Hagopian
and Ollendick’s study did not differ in learning. In these go/no-go discrimination tasks
subjects’ performance can be affected by contributions from their ability to discriminate
between the targets and distractors (called “sensitivity”) and the psychological criterion they
adopt for making a response. The placement of the response criterion determines the
subject’s “bias” towards responding or not, and can be completely independent of the
subject’s sensitivity. A difference in learning between groups of subjects should be revealed
by a change in sensitivity, and not by a change in criterion placement (response bias).
Separate analyses of correct target responses and false alarms, which is the standard
approach for the go/no-go task, cannot separate sensitivity from criterion placement changes.
We therefore applied standard decision theory methods to the group average data
reported by Hagopian and Ollendick. For the reward-only condition we found that the low
and high anxiety groups had almost identical mean sensivity indices (d-prime=0.84 for low
anxiety; d-prime=0.86 for high anxiety). However, the mean criterion placement index
differed substantially between the groups (C=-0.89 for low anxiety; C=-0.43 for high
anxiety; C=0 indicates no response bias, and the more negative the C index the greater the
bias towards responding).
It is interesting to note that RST might predict response bias effects, in experimental
tasks, as part of the motivational (rather than the reinforcing) consequences of BAS
activation. If the general experimental context were rewarding, and activated the BAS, then
any ongoing approach behaviour during the experiment might be (indiscriminately)
enhanced. It is not inconceivable, on tasks where the subject has to decide whether to
respond or not, that a BAS-induced enhancement in approach behaviour tendencies could
manifest itself as a more liberal criterion placement. The result would be an
(indiscriminately) increased number of responses, which could occur independently of the
subject’s level of learning concerning when that approach behaviour should be most
effectively applied. This still leaves the puzzle, from Hagopian and Ollendick’s data, of why
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low anxiety subjects should show a sizeable increase in response bias under predominantly
rewarding conditions.
Two other go/no-go discrimination learning studies (Zinbarg & Revelle, 1989; Zinbarg
& Mohlman, 1998) merit further attention. Zinbarg and Revelle carried out 4 similar go/no-
go experiments on a total of 310 subjects. They manipulated a number of variables across
these experiments (time of day; task difficulty; subjects’ expectations about the probability
that a go response would be needed). They used letters (or letter pairs) as targets and
distractors in the discrimination task and, within each experiment, employed two types of
target (called “go cues”) and two types of distractor (no-go cues). Targets are stimuli for
which a go response is correct; distractors are stimuli for which a no-go response is correct.
For one target type (approach cues), responses were rewarded (by gaining points visually
displayed on the screen); and for the other target type (active avoidance cues) responses
avoided the punishment (loss of points) that occurred when no response was made to these
cues. For one type of distractor (omission cues) no-go responses were rewarded (and this
reward opportunity was therefore lost when a false positive response was made to these
cues); and for the other distractor type (passive avoidance cues) false positives were
punished, so that the punishment could be passively avoided by not responding to these
distractors.
Zinbarg and Revelle argued that RST predicts that the go cues should activate the BAS
(and the no-go cues should activate the BIS), although because both cues were always
present within an experiment, the study suffers the usual uncertainty of mixed-incentive
conditions (i.e., whether BAS or BIS will be dominant for a particular subject). Zinbarg and
Revelle analysed performance for go and no-go cues separately, an approach that supposes
that the system which is dominant will keep changing as different items are presented during
the experiment. There must be some uncertainty surrounding whether the BAS and BIS can
be turned on and off (as Zinbarg and Revelle implicitly suppose) by an intermixed series of
BAS and BIS-activating stimuli of this kind, presented at a fairly rapid rate.
Zinbarg and Revelle extracted learning measures by looking at the linear trend for the
number of responses made by a subject across each experiment (experiments were divided
into four blocks for this purpose). In the statistical analyses of their data Zinbarg and Revelle
included cue type (go vs. no-go) as a repeated-measures factor. The influence of this factor
on the slope of the linear response trend reflects subjects’ ability to discriminate go from no-
go cues. However, at best this would therefore reflect a combination of two separate effects
on learning: an effect of BAS activation (for the go cues) and of BIS activation (for no-go
cues).
Zinbarg and Revelle used high and low scoring impulsivity groups to look at BAS-
related personality effects. The subjects were divided into these groups according to their
scores on an impulsivity measure derived from the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck
& Eysenck, 1975a). The impulsivity groups were crossed with high and low scoring anxiety
groups (allocated according to scores on the Trait Anxiety scale of Spielberger’s State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). The anxiety groups were
included to look at BIS-related personality effects.
The findings obtained were consistent with our earlier comments that both BAS and BIS
effects would be likely to combine to affect Zinbarg and Revelle’s learning measures. Only
one personality effect was consistent across their 4 experiments (significant in two
experiments, with a similar trend in the other two): the anxiety by impulsivity by cue type
(go vs. no-go) interaction. Specifically, among low impulsivity subjects, they found that the
discrimination between go and no-go cues was learned better by high anxiety subjects,
relative to low anxiety subjects, while the effect of anxiety was in the opposite direction for
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high impulsivity subjects. An attempt to explain this interaction in terms of the dynamics of
the competition between BAS and BIS could be attempted, but would be entirely post hoc.
Zinbarg and Mohlman (1998) reported two experiments based on the standard digit-
based version of the go/no-go discrimination task. While this study shared some of the
problems with other go/no-go studies (such as the fact that mixed-incentive conditions were
used once again), some interesting new elements were added. In the first experiment, correct
responses to targets were rewarded with 25 cents, and false positive responses to distractors
were punished with the loss of 25 cents. No feedback was given when a no-go response was
erroneously made to a target or was correctly made to a distractor.
Following the approach used by Zinbarg and Revelle (1989), Zinbarg and Mohlman
looked at learning via the slopes of the linear trends of responses (to targets and distractors
separately) across blocks of trials. In such an analysis, the targets are construed as reward
cues, which activate the BAS selectively, and the distractors are construed as punishment
cues, which activate the BIS selectively. We have already noted our concern about the
assumption, implicit in this experimental logic, that the BIS and BAS can be turned on and
off independently in response to rapidly intermixed presentations of stimuli of this kind.
In their first experiment, Zinbarg and Mohlman used the same personality measures of
anxiety and impulsivity as were used in the earlier Zinbarg and Revelle experiments. There
were no significant correlations between personality scores and the slope of the increasing
linear trend of responses to reward cues (targets) across blocks.
There was, however, a significant interaction of anxiety by impulsivity on the slope of
the decreasing trend of responses to punishment cues (distractors) across blocks. This
anxiety by impulsivity interaction was also found by Zinbarg and Revelle (1989). However,
for Zinbarg and Mohlman the interaction arose because high levels of impulsivity helped
high anxious subjects to more rapidly decrease their number of responses to punishment
cues, whereas for Zinbarg and Revelle high impulsivity impaired the ability of high anxious
subjects to learn the discrimination between BAS-activating and BIS-activating cues.
The major innovation added by Zinbarg and Mohlman (for half the subjects in
Experiment 1, and all the subjects in Experiment 2) was to get subjects to provide
expectation ratings for each stimulus, at the start of the experiment and at the end of each
block of training trials. The ratings were essentially confidence judgments about the
expected outcome of making of a response to each stimulus (on a 9-point scale from 1,
which meant subjects were “absolutely certain that [responding] will lead to losing money”,
through 5, meaning they were “completely uncertain”, to 9, meaning that they were
“absolutely certain that responding will lead to winning money”). Learning of these
expectancies was assessed via the slopes of the linear trends over blocks, computed
separately for reward (target) and punishment (distractor) cues.
In their first experiment, there were no significant personality correlations with reward
expectancy learning (i.e., the slope of the increasing trend of expectancies to reward cues
over blocks). However, there was a significant correlation between anxiety and punishment
expectancy learning (i.e., the slope of the decreasing trend of expectancies to punishment
cues over blocks). This correlation reflected the fact that more anxious subjects acquired
negative expectancies (about losing money) for the punishment cues more quickly than less
anxious subjects. This result is consistent with the similar finding reported by Corr et al
(1995) using a different measure of anxiety.
In Zinbarg and Mohlman’s second experiment all the subjects provided expectancy
ratings. Half the subjects were tested under financial incentives as before, but the other half
had potentially more ego-involving reinforcement: gaining estimated IQ points for correct
response to targets and losing estimated IQ points for false positives. They added further
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measures of anxiety and impulsive sensation seeking. The BAS Drive and BAS Reward
Responsiveness scales were used for impulsive sensation seeking, and the BIS scale was
used for anxiety (these scales were developed by Carver & White, 1994).
None of the predicted personality effects on the slopes of the linear trends of responses,
to either reward or punishment cues, was significant in either the ego-reinforcement or
monetary-reinforcement conditions. This included the anxiety by impulsivity interaction
terms which had previously been significant (in Experiment 1, for punishment cues).
However, both anxiety measures (Spielberger’s Trait Anxiety and the BIS scale) were
significantly positively correlated with the slope of the linear trend of responses to the
reward cues in the monetary reinforcement condition. This correlation is not expected to be
significant under RST.
In the ego-reinforcement condition, there were no significant personality correlations
with reward expectancy learning. However, there was a significant correlation between the
BIS scale anxiety measure and punishment expectancy learning. This correlation indicated
that high anxious subjects acquired the negative expectancies more rapidly than low anxious
subjects. (In the monetary reinforcement condition, the corresponding correlation was
nonsignificant and in the opposite direction.)
In the monetary reinforcement condition, there was a significant positive correlation of
the BAS Reward Responsiveness scale with reward expectancy learning (in the ego
reinforcement condition, the corresponding correlation was actually -- nonsignificantly --
negative). In the monetary reinforcement condition, the only significant personality effect on
punishment expectancy learning was with Spielberger’s Trait Anxiety scale. However, this
correlation reflected a faster acquisition of negative expectancies in lower anxiety subjects.
This result was thus in the opposite direction both to the effect observed in the first
experiment, and to that seen (for the BIS scale) in the ego-reinforcement condition of the
second experiment.
In summary, Zinbarg and Mohlman’s experiment found very little evidence for
correlations between BAS-related personality traits (impulsivity, sensation seeking) and
learning under rewarding reinforcement. They did find several significant associations with
the BIS-related personality trait (anxiety), but these seemed to raise more questions than they
answered. Why were the effects significant but sometimes in the wrong direction? Why were
they sometimes significant for learning about reward cues (for which anxiety is predicted to
have no effect)? Why were they not replicable across monetary vs. ego-involving modalities
of reinforcement, or across similar experiments? These problems are not unique to this
study; we have noted similar problems in much of the other literature relevant to RST (see
Pickering et al, 1997).
Our own laboratory has attempted to make a contribution to the literature on BAS-related
effects on learning with two studies (Corr et al, 1995; Pickering et al, 1995). Both these
studies did use a reward-only reinforcement condition. Pickering et al (1995) used a maze-
learning task, but failed to find any significant correlations between a number of potential
BAS-related personality traits and rate of learning of the maze under reward. They did report
significant personality effects (of Eysenck’s Venturesomeness scale; S.B.G.Eysenck et al,
1985b) on the speed of the subjects’ movements across the maze, but this seems likely to be
a motivational effect of BAS activation. Corr et al’s (1995) instrumental learning task also
used response time as its main dependent variable, and so is also likely to be influenced by
any motivational effects that were produced by BAS activation. However, there were no
significant effects of potential BAS-related personality trait measures on asymptotic
response speed in the reward condition (in fact, as discussed by Pickering et al, 1997, there
were significant effects of trait anxiety).
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The final study we will review is a complex experiment by Ball and Zuckerman (1990).
In many ways this represents the best experiment looking at the influence of BAS-related
personality traits on learning. They tested 140 undergraduate subjects who scored either in
the upper or lower decile of the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1979). They used a
concept-learning task (which can be thought of as a series of simultaneous, rather than
go/no-go, discrimination problems).
The visual stimuli were presented in a pair on each trial, with one stimulus on each trial
being the target, to which the subject had to respond, and the other stimulus serving as a
distractor. The position of the target stimulus varied from left to right across trials. The
stimuli were compounds of elements drawn from eight binary dimensions (i.e., a stimulus
contained either a letter T or an X; it had either one or two borders around the letter etc.).
Two dimensions (letter shape and border shape) were critical dimensions (and particular
values on those dimensions, counterbalanced across subjects, designated the target stimulus).
On each trial, the target stimulus in the pair contained target values on both the critical
dimensions (e.g., letter T and square border); the distractor stimulus contained the
complementary values (e.g., letter X and circular border). Across the 16 stimulus-pairings
used in the experiment, each value, from each of the other six non-critical dimensions,
appeared eight times in a target stimulus and eight times in a distractor stimulus3. (The target
and distractor stimuli in a pair were complementary to each other on all eight dimensions.)
Ball and Zuckerman used four different reinforcement conditions, formed by crossing
two between-subjects factors: verbal vs. monetary reinforcement; and reward-only vs.
punishment-only conditions. No feedback was given for errors during the reward-only
condition, nor for correct responses in the punishment-only condition. (The authors also used
subject gender as a factor in their analyses, but this need not concern us here.) Although the
paper reported response latency data, the primary results for the present chapter concern the
learning measures. Ball and Zuckerman report the number of trials that each subject took to
reach a criterion of five consecutive correct responses. The 16 stimulus-pairs were presented
once each in a training epoch. After each epoch was completed, training continued
immediately with the next epoch, in which all stimulus-pairings were again used once. On
reaching the criterion, there was a non-reversal shift (i.e., two previously non-critical
dimensions became the critical dimension and the previously critical dimensions became
non-critical). This shift was not signalled to the subjects, other than through the
reinforcement they received, and subjects continued the task until they reached the same
learning criterion after the shift.
When the trials to criterion data were analysed with a repeated-measures factor (phase of
learning: pre- vs. post- shift), there were no interactions of any of the between-subjects
factors with the phase of learning. We will therefore mostly concentrate on the results from
the pre-shift phase. The main finding was that the high sensation seeking group of subjects
learned the task significantly faster (i.e. reached the criterion in fewer trials) than the low
sensation seeking group. A high extraversion group learned faster than a low extraversion
group, and a group with high P scale scores learned faster than a group with low P scores (in
the post-shift phase). These other groupings were based on scores from the EPQ (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1975b). However, the findings for the other personality scales are of dubious
interest given that the subject groups were selected for extreme sensation seeking scores.
This means that the groupings for other, correlated, personality scales (such as extraversion
                                                            
3 This was true for the “Random condition” of their experiment; half the subjects were tested in a so-called
“Correlated condition” in which the values for one of the six non-critical dimensions had a 75%
concordance with the target values from the critical dimensions. This factor did not affect the findings most
relevant for the present chapter.
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and the P scale) are going to be confounded with sensation seeking scores. (Ball and
Zuckerman reported the results for the other personality scales after covarying out sensation
seeking scores, as an attempt to reduce this problem. However, this attempted solution is
statistically dubious: see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996.)
The other key finding was that the effect of sensation seeking group on learning did not
interact with reinforcement condition (and neither did the effect of extraversion or P group).
Ball and Zuckerman, following RST, had predicted that the beneficial effects on learning of
sensation seeking, and other BAS-related traits, would have been restricted to the reward-
only reinforcement conditions. These data raise the possibility that BAS-related personality
traits may affect learning through mechanisms that are not connected with sensitivity to
positive reinforcers.
Ball and Zuckerman offered two possible explanations for why high sensation seekers
might have learned this task faster than low sensation seekers, irrespective of reinforcement
condition. First, they suggested that, relative to low sensation seekers, high sensation seekers
might have adopted a beneficial risk-taking cognitive strategy during the early trial-and-error
stages of the task. Second, Ball and Zuckerman argued that high sensation seekers might
have superior selective attention abilities to low sensation seekers, and thus be better able to
focus in on the relevant stimulus dimensions rather than the irrelevant ones. Ball and
Zuckerman noted existing data (Martin, 1985) that were consistent with their attentional
account. We will return to this issue below, where we shall expand on the attentional
explanation.
To summarize this section, we would suggest that the literature reviewed gives pretty
weak support for RST’s predictions concerning BAS-related personality effects on learning.
However, we also feel that the studies concerned have rarely tested the theory adequately,
often failing to meet one or more of the four conditions we outlined earlier. Nonetheless, the
study by Ball and Zuckerman seemed to contain all the necessary elements, and it produced
significant associations between BAS-related personality measures (i.e., measures of
ImpASS) and learning. Unfortunately, the correlations did not depend on the presence of
rewarding reinforcement.
As Ball and Zuckerman suggest, we might conclude that ImpASS traits can affect
learning through psychological mechanisms unrelated to a subject’s responsivity to positive
reinforcement. At present we take this possible conclusion seriously, because we have a
series of unpublished findings which replicate Ball and Zuckerman’s results with different
ImpASS measures and slightly differing learning tasks. A key feature is that our learning
tasks have been designed to minimise, and in one case to completely remove, any
contribution from environmentally-provided positive reinforcement.
From a neuropsychological perspective, we might tentatively believe that ImpASS traits
are associated with variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission, in accordance with the
data reviewed earlier. If other psychological mechanisms, unrelated to reinforcement
processes, are responsible for ImpASS-learning correlations, then it is conceivable that they
will depend, in some way, upon dopaminergic neurotransmission.
The position just outlined still leaves us with a lack of evidence, from learning studies at
least, in support of RST’s BAS-related personality predictions. It is ironic that the evidence
base for BAS-mediated personality effects is so weak, given the widespread belief in a BAS-
like brain-behavioural system, along with an associated fundamental personality trait that is
partly dopaminergic in nature (see the peer commentaries on the major recent review by
Depue and Collins, 1999). Against this zeitgeist, one must consider the question of how
much longer one should continue to test a theory which seems so unable to generate
consistent support. On reflection, we think it would be premature to abandon the concept of
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the BAS in personality research just yet. Perhaps the research on learning (and other)
behavioural processes, which are predicted to correlate with BAS functioning, would benefit
from having a more precise theoretical formulation to generate experimental predictions.
In light of the above, we decided to formalise the predictions of RST, concerning BAS-
related reinforcement effects on learning, in the form of a biologically-constrained neural
network model. This approach to the neuropsychology of reinforcement effects is possible,
given our growing appreciation of the role of DA in reinforcement learning, and the many
models of DA-related reinforcement which now exist (as discussed above). In the next
section we present the results of such modelling and the surprising insights we have started
to gain from it.
A Neural Network Model of BAS-Related Personality Effects on Learning
In order to construct a biologically-constrained network model in this section, we will
need to draw upon some of the neural circuitry that we considered earlier (see Figure 1). We
will present simulations of Ball and Zuckerman’s concept formation experiment (the random
condition with positive reinforcement), partly because it is the best published test of RST’s
predictions regarding personality and positive reinforcement effects on learning, but also
because the task they used is essentially a category learning task. Category learning tasks
involve mapping multiple novel stimuli into a smaller number of separate response classes
(such as arbitrary category labels or, in the case of Ball and Zuckerman’s study, left- or
right-sided button presses). The neuropsychology of category learning tasks is currently
being intensively researched and there is a growing understanding of the underlying neural
circuitry. It is especially pleasing, from our current perspective, to observe that category
learning tasks are believed to depend on the dopaminergically-innervated striatal circuits
implicated in the functioning of the BAS.
In an excellent and wide-ranging review, Ashby et al. (1998) describe the importance of
the structures shown in Figure 2 for category learning. For a visual task, a high-level visual
representation of the stimulus would be computed in extrastriate visual areas (e.g.,
inferotemporal cortex) and this information would project to the tail of the caudate in the
striatum. There is feedback from the striatum to the prefrontal cortex via a complex set of
striato-pallido-thalamo-cortical loops, and the prefrontal cortex completes the circuit by
projecting back to the (head of the) caudate and the thalamus. Ashby et al suggest that units
in the prefrontal cortex are associated with one of the category responses required, and
project cortico-cortically to the appropriate motor execution units in premotor and/or motor
cortex. The nigrostriatal DA pathway is shown projecting from the substantia nigra pars
compacta (SNc) to the striatum. The mesolimbic DA pathway is shown projecting from the
ventral tegmental area (VTA) to the prefrontal cortex.
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Figure 2
A box diagram of a cortico-striato-pallido-thalamo-cortical processing loop. Dotted arrows
show the dopaminergic projections to striatum and prefrontal cortex. Abbreviations: SNc
substantia nigra pars compacta; VTA ventral tegmental area; GPe external segment of the
globus pallidus; GPi internal segment of the globus pallidus; Sth subthalamic nucleus.
Ashby et al (1998) review the evidence on category learning in various subject groups
who have impairments to the above circuitry. Perhaps the most compelling data relate to
patients with Parkinson’s disease, a condition characterised by extensive dopaminergic cell
loss in the nigrostriatal DA pathway. These patients been shown to be severely impaired at a
probabilistic category learning task while showing good memory for the details of the
computer screen layout and stimulus materials used (Knowlton, Mangels, & Squire, 1996).
In our model we simplified the circuitry of Figure 2 into an equivalent three-layer
network that is depicted in Figure 3. There is a “stimulus pattern” (SP) layer (extrastriate
visual cortex) providing the input to the “S-R representation” (SRR) layer (striatum); this in
turn projects to, and receives projections back from, a “response decision” (RD) layer
(prefrontal cortex). Note that the (corticostriatal) synapses between the SP and SRR layers
Neocortex
SNc
VTA
Sth Thalamus
GPiGPe
Prefrontal Cortex
Striatum
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are modifiable (shown as round arrowheads), under the influence of a dopaminergic positive
reinforcement signal (arising in SNc), using a 3-factor learning rule of the kind described
earlier. The synapses between the SRR and RD layers are modifiable in a similar way, under
the influence of a dopaminergic positive reinforcement signal (arising in VTA). We can
think of these latter synapses as being thalamo-cortical, i.e. the last synapse in the pathway
from striatum via globus pallidus and thalamus to the prefrontal cortex (although several of
the synapses in that pathway might be modifiable). Figure 3 also depicts modifiable
synapses in the reciprocal pathway between the RD and SRR layers (there are round
arrowheads at each end of the connections between the SRR and RD layers). In the
simulations presented in this chapter this reciprocal pathway is omitted for simplicity.
Finally, Figure 3 shows lateral inhibitory connections between units in both the SRR and
RD layers (horizontal double-headed arrows). These mutual inhibitory interactions are used
to select a single active neuron in each layer when input is passed to the network (so-called
“winner-takes-all” competition). Mutual inhibitory connections like this are thought to exist
in the striatum, because the striatal neurons have extensive axon collaterals contacting other
striatal cells, and firing of the striatal neurons releases the inhibitory neurotransmitter –
amino butyric acid (GABA) at synapses on their target neurons (see Groves, Garcia-Munoz,
Linder, Manley, Martone, & Young, 1995, pp. 68-69).
The inputs to the network comprised the pairs of stimuli used on each trial of Ball and
Zuckerman’s task. Each pair of stimuli was coded as a vector of 32 binary neurons. The
values of the vector elements can be thought of as representing the output firing (1=firing;
0=not firing) of the SP layer (i.e., visual cortical) neurons processing the stimulus-pairs. 16
neurons coded for the stimulus on the left on a particular trial, and 16 corresponding neurons
coded for the stimulus on the right. There was one pair of neurons, in each set of 16, that
coded for each of the 8 stimulus dimensions (e.g., neurons 1 and 2 coded for the letter shape
of the left stimulus, while neurons 17 and 18 coded for the letter shape of the right stimulus).
In each pair of neurons the pattern {01} was used to code for one value on the dimension
(e.g., letter shape=T), and the complementary pattern {10} was used to code for the
complementary value on the dimension (e.g., letter shape=X). Thus, if the left stimulus had a
letter T in it, and the right stimulus had an X in it, then SP layer neurons 1, 2, 17 and 18 had
the output values {01…..10……}. The same coding approach was used across all eight
stimulus dimensions.
Two stimulus dimensions were designated to be critical, and particular values on those
two dimensions, determined randomly for each subject, defined the target stimulus within a
stimulus-pair. As we simulated the so-called “random” condition from Ball and Zuckerman,
each of the values on each of the noncritical stimulus dimensions appeared eight times in a
target stimulus and eight times in a distractor stimulus, across the set of 16 stimuli. Two RD
layer neurons were used in the simulations. If the left stimulus was the target, then activation
of the first RD neuron was considered to be the correct response; when the right stimulus
was the target the activation of the other RD neuron was considered correct. (We did not
model the processes that pass activity from the response decision neurons to the motor
execution neurons in premotor and motor cortex.)
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Figure 3:
A schematic architecture for the neural network model with 3 layers (Stimulus Pattern; S-R
Representation; Response Decision). Dotted arrows indicate dopaminergic reinforcement
projections arising from cells that are activated by primary and secondary reward stimuli.
Double-headed horizontal arrows indicate inhibitory interactions within the S-R
Representation and Response Decision layers of the model. Round arrowheads indicate
modifiable synapses, and where these are double-headed reciprocal connections between
layers are included. Only a subset of neurons in the Stimulus Pattern and S-R Representation
layers are depicted for clarity. Abbreviations: S-R stimulus-response; DA dopaminergic
reinforcement signals.
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When a correct response was made by the network, a positive reinforcement signal (with
a strength represented by parameter RP) was used as part of the learning rule (see below).
The parameter RP had a value of zero when there was no positive reinforcement (as occurred
after an error in Ball and Zuckerman’s positive reinforcement conditions). We did not model
the processes by which the positive reinforcement signal could arise, as a result of the
positive reinforcement provided to the subject. We could have done so, in a relatively
straightforward fashion, by adding elements from Brown et al’s (1999) model to our current
simulation.
Ten SRR layer (striatal) neurons were used in the simulations. There was 100%
feedforward connectivity between the 32 neurons of the SP layer and the 10 neurons of the
SRR layer, and 100% connectivity between the 10 neurons of the SRR layer and the 2
neurons of the RD layer. The initial weights of these connections were drawn from random
normal distributions (mean=0.3 and s.d.=0.065 for SP layer to SRR layer; mean=0.5 and
s.d.=0.125 for SRR layer to RD layer; any values randomly falling below 0 were set to 0).
The simulations created 100 simulated subjects and each subject had a unique random
weight initialisation according to the above parameters. A training epoch was a set of 16
trials in which each stimulus pair was presented once. Each epoch used a different random
order of the stimuli, and the orders for each epoch were randomised for each subject
individually. A critical element of the simulation was the value taken by the positive
reinforcement parameter (RP) when the response was followed by positive reinforcement (RP
was 0 when responses were wrong). The value was varied across simulated subjects to
reflect the individual sensitivities of the BAS to reinforcing stimuli, but the same value was
used for all the positive reinforcements experienced by a particular subject. High values
reflected large reactions to positive reinforcements delivered in the experiment, and
therefore any simulated subject with a high value was considered to have high levels of
BAS-related personality traits. (The RP values for positively reinforced trials were drawn
from a random normal distribution with mean=2 and s.d.=0.3) Thus, there were only three
factors which varied across subjects: the initial weight randomisation; the random order of
the training items; and the value of the reinforcing effect produced by a positive reinforcer.
Training continued until the criterion of five consecutive correct responses was reached
and the number of trials required for each subject was recorded. A nonreversal shift was not
used in the simulation; instead training continued until five epochs were completed, by
which time all subjects had comfortably reached the learning criterion.
Before presenting the results of the simulations, we will give the equations used in the
model. We can define ej as the excitatory input to the jth neuron in the SRR layer. The
equation for ej is standard in neural networks:
ej = i wij * xiout … (1)
where xiout is the output from ith SP layer neuron and wij is the weight from ith SP layer to
the jth SRR layer neuron. The SRR layer neuron with the largest excitatory input was then
deemed the winner of the competition within the SRR layer, and had its output set to a value
of one; the outputs of all the other SRR layer units were set to zero. The output from the
active SRR layer neuron activated the RD layer neurons (according to an equation identical
to Equation 1 above) and the RD layer neurons then entered a competition from which one
emerged as the winner. It was assumed (but not modelled) that the active RD neuron then
triggered its associated response, and then the environment provided positive reinforcement
if the response was correct.
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After the response was made, and any positive feedback was received, the network
underwent learning according to a three-factor learning rule. Neural activities and outputs
were reset between trials, but the weight values evolved, according to the learning rule, from
trial to trial, without any decay from one trial to the next. The learning rule specifies the
change in weight brought about by a single trial. We can write the following equation
describing wij, which is the change for a synapse between the ith SP and jth SRR neurons:
wij = yjout( 1RP[xiout – 2wij] - 3 xiout wij) … (2)
where yjout is the output from the jth SRR layer neuron and 1, 2, and 3 are learning rate
constants (0.05, 0.75, and 0.3 respectively). This is a three-factor learning rule because yjout is
the postsynaptic term (factor 1), xiout  is the presynaptic term (factor 2), and RP is the positive
reinforcement term (factor 3). When each of these three factors is present there is long-term
strengthening (potentiation) of the weights. Note also that when factors 1 and 2 are present,
but are not followed by positive reinforcement (i.e., when RP=0, following an erroneous
response), the synaptic weights are weakened at a rate determined by the constant 3. This is
in keeping with the evidence, noted earlier, that lack of positive reinforcement may lead to
long-term synaptic depression in the striatum. An identical equation (with identical learning
rate constants) was used to modify the weights between the SRR layer and RD layer
neurons.
Results of Simulations of the Random Condition from Ball and Zuckerman (1990)
Ball and Zuckerman (1990) did not give the mean number of trials to criterion that their
subjects required to learn the pre-shift task. From their graphs, however, it can be seen that
the criterion for the post-shift task was reached after an average of around 17.5 trials. The
choice of the above learning rate parameters (and other network features) was constrained so
that we obtained an average number of trials to criterion for the pre-shift task that was under
20 trials (in fact the average for the 100 simulated subjects was 18.9). Figure 4 shows the
mean number of correct responses per epoch for the 5 complete epochs that were simulated.
This figure shows that almost every subject was responding perfectly to all stimuli by the
third training epoch.
From Equation (2) the rate of learning (i.e., w) is directly proportional to the positive
reinforcement parameter, RP. We therefore felt certain that learning performance would show
a simple direct correlation with an individual’s RP value. In this task simulation, where
learning was measured via the number of trials to criterion (a measure which gets smaller as
learning is faster), it was predicted that a negative correlation would be found. Indeed, when
presenting the model at a scientific meeting, one of us (AP) was so sure of the result that he
didn’t bother to carry out the simulations, claiming it was self-evident that the expected
correlation would emerge (and no-one in the audience, including some experienced
modellers, suggested otherwise). We were therefore extremely surprised when it proved very
difficult to find sizeable correlations between trials to criterion and RP. Figure 5 shows the
results for the parameter settings described above. This graph does depict a very modest (but
significant) negative correlation (r=-0.25, p<0.02), associated with the best-fitting
regression line shown in the figure.
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Figure 4:
The mean number of correct responses per training epoch made by 100 simulated subjects.
The simulation was of the task used by Ball and Zuckerman (1990; random condition with
positive reinforcement). There are 16 training stimuli presented once each per training
epoch.
Figure 5:
Scatterplot of the number of trials taken by a simulated subject to reach the learning criterion
against the value of the positive reinforcement signal which followed a correct response. The
best fitting linear regression line is shown (R2=0.06).
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We chose to report the results for these parameter settings because they produced a
correlation typical of the significant correlations we obtained. Many other simulations we
ran, using alternative parameter values and different network properties, failed to produce a
significant correlation between learning performance and RP values. We varied almost every
aspect of the model including: (a) the values of the learning rate constants (i.e., we allowed
values which resulted in the mean number of trials to criterion across the 100 simulated
subjects being greater than 20); (b) the numbers of neurons in the SRR layer; (c) the number
of winning neurons in the SRR layer (i.e., we allowed more than one winning neuron); (d)
the degree of connectivity between the SP and SRR layers (i.e., we allowed each SP neurons
to have synapses with only a proportion of the SRR neurons); and (e) the mean (and s.d.) of
the distribution from which individual subjects’ RP values were sampled. We also tried
adding a number of other reasonable features to the model that might enhance the size of the
correlation. In each simulation we also looked at whether other measures of learning
performance might be more sensitive to the correlation. Nothing we did gave us a correlation
substantially bigger than the one reported above; the correlations were almost all between 0
and –0.35.
Even if the small correlation reported above approximates the “correct” value for this
model, we are confident that it would usually be impossible to detect the influence of such a
correlation in a real experiment, akin to the one conducted by Ball and Zuckerman (1990).
First, our simulation restricted very severely the number of individual differences that might
contribute to a subject’s performance (individual simulated subjects varied in their RP value,
the randomisation of their initial weight settings, and the randomisation for the order of
stimuli used across training trials). Real subjects’ performance is almost certain to be
affected by a host of other individual noise factors, which would act to reduce any
correlation. Second, even if RST were correct in essence, the BAS-related personality trait
measures are themselves likely to have a far from perfect correlation with the underlying
biological variables that give rise to the variations in reinforcement sensitivity. Our
simulated correlation is directly between variations in learning performance and variations in
degree of biological reinforcement experienced. By contrast, the correlation with personality,
in a real experiment, would be diluted further by the correlation between the reinforcement
variable and the BAS-traits measures being used.
The second point in the foregoing paragraph is not damaging to all computational models
of this kind: we were quite easily able to construct a non-reinforcement model which was
able to generate correlations of 0.8 (in 100 simulated subjects) between learning
performance and the critical parameter that varied across subjects. We feel that simulated
correlations need to be of this order of magnitude in order to be detectable in real
experiments using personality trait measures. Incidentally, these other simulations, which do
not use reinforcement learning processes, increase our confidence that a non-reinforcement
model may, in principle, be able to account for the significant learning-personality
correlations reported by Ball and Zuckerman.
It is important to note that our surprise finding for the reinforcement learning model
holds for other kinds of learning task, and is not limited to the Ball and Zuckerman
procedure. We have used the same reinforcement model to simulate other well-known
category learning tasks, including ones which take more trials to master, and have similarly
found a great difficulty in obtaining significant correlations between RP and learning.
Ongoing work is attempting to understand the reason for this general lack of correlation.
We feel that the findings from this modelling study, although negative in one sense, may
be of considerable importance. The results might indicate a general explanation for the
difficulty, which emerged from the literature reviewed above, in obtaining consistent
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personality-learning correlations in experiments testing the predictions of RST. Even if RST
were true with respect to positive reinforcement and personality, the simulations suggest that
it may be almost impossible to detect the predicted associations for many learning tasks. The
model suggests the surprising result that, although positive reinforcement may be vital for
learning to occur (and there would be no learning in our model if RP were zero for positively
reinforced trials), variations in the strength of reinforcement experienced across subjects
may often contribute little to the observed variance in learning performance. Going further,
one might derive a practical recommendation from these simulation findings: before
conducting any future studies of BAS-related personality traits and learning under positive
reinforcement, it might therefore be appropriate to build a computational model of the task to
see if that learning task is likely to be sensitive to variations in reinforcement across subjects.
These conclusions strengthen the view, outlined earlier, that impulsive antisocial
sensation seeking personality traits may correlate with learning performance for reasons that
are unrelated to positive reinforcement processes. In the next section we consider these ideas
further.
Alternative Accounts for the Effects of ImpASS Personality Traits on Learning
Ball and Zuckerman’s (1990) suggestion, that subjects with high ImpASS personality
scores might have superior selective attention abilities to subjects with lower scores, was
noted earlier in this chapter. This claim, if true, could explain superior learning performance
for subjects with high, rather than low, ImpASS scores, at least on tasks requiring the
selective learning of relationships involving some stimulus features, rather than others. Ball
and Zuckerman’s own task was of this kind, because successful learning depended on
focusing on the two critical stimulus dimensions that were associated with response
categories, and ignoring the six other nonpredictive distracting dimensions.
This idea resonates with suggestions we have previously made (Gray et al, 1999)
concerning the functions of one of the DA systems implicated in the operation of the BAS.
We presented evidence that the mesolimbic dopaminergic projection pathway causes release
of DA in the nucleus accumbens (in the ventral striatum) in response to the salience of a
stimulus, with higher release reflecting greater stimulus salience. By this account both
rewards, and stimuli associated with reward, would cause DA release, because they are
either biologically or associatively salient. However, the account proposes that other stimuli
should activate DA release (novel stimuli, punishments, or stimuli associated with
punishment), even though these other stimuli are unconnected with positive reinforcement. It
is conceivable that ImpASS personality traits reflect inter-individual variations in the
functioning of a system involved in stimulus salience processing: we will consider the
relevant evidence below.
Latent inhibition (LI) is a task which we have argued is critically dependent upon
stimulus salience processing operations in the nucleus accumbens. In LI tasks with animals,
the subjects are preexposed to a stimulus that has no significant consequences. After an
adequate period of such pre-treatment, it is thought that the preexposed stimulus loses
salience and becomes “selected out” from the focus of attention. This is shown in the second
phase of the task in which the stimulus contingencies are changed so that the preexposed
stimulus is now predictive of a biological reinforcer. Because the preexposure phase has
caused the stimulus to lose salience, the subsequent learning of the association between the
stimulus and the reinforcer is retarded (relative to subjects who have not undergone the
preexposure phase). This retardation of learning is the LI phenomenon.
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Gray et al (1999) review the key evidence in support of this salience-based account of
LI, concentrating on the evidence for the vital role of DA release in the nucleus accumbens.
In particular, LI in animals and human beings is sensitive to treatment by DA agonists and
antagonists. By defining “salience” carefully in a neural network model, we have been able
to model the complex effects of these drugs on LI tasks (Schmajuk et al, 1998). To achieve
this, it was necessary to equate the pharmacologically induced changes in accumbens DA
release with changes to the value of the salience parameter (in the modelling work, salience
has been termed “novelty”).
Several LI tasks suitable for human subjects have been developed, mostly based around
operant learning procedures (see Lubow & Gewirtz, 1995). There has now been a large
number of studies looking at the personality traits (and other individual differences factors)
associated with LI performance. A partial review of the studies is provided by the
information summarised in Table 2 (but note that Table 2 does not contain an exhaustive list
of all the studies.)
There is some evidence that LI may be associated with many individual differences
variables (e.g., Peterson and Carson, 2000), but two principal types of personality scale have
been used in these studies summarised in Table 2. One type attempts to measure schizotypal
personality traits, i.e. those traits in healthy subjects that reflect tendencies towards
schizophrenic-like behaviours, emotions and cognitions (see Vollema and van den Bosch,
1995, for a review of schizotypal personality measures in general). The other type measures
ImpASS personality characteristics (the P scale has been the most widely used; see Table 2).
The focus on schizotypal personality arises because LI is reduced in certain types of
schizophrenic patients (see Gray et al, 1999) and there is interest in seeing whether a similar
change in LI can be observed in subjects who, although healthy, score highly on schizotypal
personality traits. In fact, from reading the papers in Table 2 it is clear that the P scale has
been included in many LI studies (including our own: Baruch et al, 1988) because it was
construed as a schizotypal personality scale (in keeping with Eysenck’ original designation
of the scale as a “Psychoticism” scale). Careful psychometric work within mainstream
personality theory (see Gibbons & Rammsayer, 1999, for a review) has shown that the P
scale clusters strongly with measures of impulsivity and sensation seeking. In multivariate
analyses of schizotypal personality scales, which have often included P, it is clear that the P
scale forms the major part of a fourth “asocial” or “impulsive-nonconformist” schizotypal
factor. This factor does not map onto a syndrome that can be seen within schizophrenia
(unlike the other three “true” schizotypal factors that emerge from these analyses) but
instead resembles features of borderline, antisocial, and schizoid personality disorders (see
Vollema and van den Bosch, 1995, for a review).
It seems clear from Table 2 that measures of schizotypal personality and ImpASS
personality traits both affect LI, in the majority of the studies, although neither type of
measure accounts for a clear majority of the significant findings. Subjects who score highly
on these scales show reduced LI. When in the preexposure condition of the LI experiment,
these high scoring subjects learn associations with the preexposed stimulus (during the
second phase of the LI task) largely as if they had not undergone the preexposure phase.
Unlike low-scoring subjects, subjects with high scores on schizotypal or ImpASS personality
traits appear to be treating the preexposed stimulus as if it were still salient.
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Table 2.
A partial summary of studies relating LI task performance to impulsive antisocial sensation
seeking and/or schizotypal personality variables.
Personality Studies of LI
Study Nature of LI Task Personality Scales Used Significant Effects Seen
Baruch et al
(1988)
Auditory operant
learning (OL)
P scale1; STA scalea;
Launay-Slade
Hallucination scaleb
P and LI interaction* (low P subjects, but
not high P subjects, show LI)
Expt. 1: Auditory
OL
P scale; STA scale P and LI interaction (low P subjects, but
not high P subjects, show LI); similar
interaction for STA
Lubow et al
(1992)
Expt. 2: Visual OL P scale; STA scale Same interactions as for Expt. 1
Lipp & Vaitl
(1992)
Pavlovian
Differential
Electrodermal
Conditioning
Revised P scale2; STA
scale; Launay-Slade
Hallucination scale
High STA subjects show significantly
more differential conditioning than low
STA in preexposure conditions; both
groups show equivalent conditioning in
control condition
De la Casa et al
(1993; Expt. 1)
Visual OL Psychosis-proneness (PP)
groupings based on specific
MMPI scale scoresc
Low PP subjects showed LI but high PP
subjects did not (with 6 mins preexposure
for preexposure group); no LI for either
personality group (with 3 mins
preexposure); LI for both groups (with 15
mins preexposure)
Lipp et al
(1994)
Expt. 3: Visual OL Revised P scale; STB
scale3;
STA scale; Launay-Slade
Hallucination scale; VSSd;
SPQe; a subset of the
Chapman scalesc
No significant personality and LI
interactions
Lipp et al
(1994)
Expt. 4: Pavlovian
Differential
Electrodermal
Conditioning
Same scales as for Expt. 3 STA and LI interaction (high STA
subjects in preexposure condition; and
low STA subjects in control condition
show significant differential
conditioning); similar interactions for
STB and Launay-Slade scales
Allan et al
(1995)
Auditory OL P scale; STB scale; STA
scale
STA and STB scales were both associated
with LI (high scores reduce LI)
independently of smoker/nonsmoker
grouping; P scale effect on LI not
independent of smoking group
Gibbons &
Rammsayer
(1999)
Visual OL P scale; Sensation Seeking
scale (SSS)4; I7–Impulsive-
ness5 (here all scales used
were German versions)
P and LI interaction (low, but not high,
scorers show significant LI); similar
effect for Disinhibition subscale of SSS
Personality, Dopamine, Reinforcement,  and Learning 143
Personality Studies of LI
Study Nature of LI Task Personality Scales Used Significant Effects Seen
Hofer et al
(1999)
Visual OL STA scale STA and LI interaction (low, but not high,
STA groups show significant LI)
Peterson &
Carson (2000)
Auditory OL Revised P scale; Extra-
version and NEO PI
scales¶
Higher P scores were significantly
associated with faster learning
performance for subjects in the
preexposure condition, but not for
subjects in the control condition; the P
effect in the preexposure condition was no
longer significant after partialling out
extraversion and “openness to
experience” scores
Note: *All the studies included used a between-subjects LI procedure with preexposure and control (non-
preexposure) conditions. In these cases, interactions between personality and LI therefore refer to a
differential between-subjects LI effect for high and low scoring personality groups. ImpASS personality
measures used: 1EPQ-P (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975b); 2Revised EPQ-P (S.B.G.Eysenck et al, 1985a); 3STB
(Claridge & Broks, 1984); 4Zuckerman (1979); 5S.B.G.Eysenck et al (1985b). Schizotypal personality
measures used: aSTA (Claridge & Broks, 1984); bLaunay & Slade (1981); cSee article for details; dVenables,
Wilkins, Mitchell, Raine, & Bailes (1990); eRaine (1991). We include the STB scale as a measure of ImpASS
traits because it was designed to index personality features similar to those found in Borderline Personality
Disorder, and items from ithe STB scale load (with P scale items) onto the fourth “asocial” schizotypal factor,
which we argue is an ImpASS factor (see text).
We do not consider any of these scales (S.B.G.Eysenck et al, 1985a; Costa & McCrae, 1992) to measure
either schizotypal or ImpASS personality traits directly.
The evidence for an effect of ImpASS traits on LI is consistent with the suggestion that
these traits may index inter-individual variations in stimulus salience processing, and
increases the plausibility that this suggestion might underlie the correlations between
ImpASS traits and performance on other kinds of learning tasks. Given the robust effects on
LI, which can be obtained by manipulations of dopaminergic neurotransmission, then one
might argue that the ImpASS-LI correlations provide a further line of support for the claim
that ImpASS traits are associated with variations in dopaminergic neurotransmission. The
other evidence in line with this claim was reviewed earlier. We have also noted the specific
proposal (Gray et al, 1999; Schmajuk et al, 1998) that it is the mesolimbic DA projection to
nucleus accumbens which is critically involved in processing the salience of a stimulus. This
idea might then lead to the more refined suggestion as to the localisation of the
dopaminergic substrate of ImpASS traits.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that some measures of ImpASS traits (e.g., the P scale)
show moderate, positive, and significant correlations (e.g., between 0.4 and 0.6 in our data
from student samples) with measures of “true” schizotypal personality factors such as the
Unusual Experiences and Cognitive Disorganisation scales developed by Mason and
Claridge (Mason, Claridge, & Jackson, 1995). This observation would seem to raise three
possibilities: (i) that both ImpASS measures and true schizotypal personality measures are
independently associated with LI; (ii) ImpASS measures are associated with LI but true
schizotypal measures appear to affect LI only by dint of their association with ImpASS
measures; or (iii) true schizotypal measures are associated with LI but ImpASS measures
appear to affect LI only by dint of their association with true schizotypal measures. If
A.D. Pickering & J. A. Gray144
possibility (iii) were true, then effects of ImpASS traits on learning, such as those reported
by Ball and Zuckerman (1990), may actually have been proxies for a real underlying
association between schizotypal personality and (certain types of) learning.
We know of no published data that strongly distinguish between the above possibilities.
However, the study by Gibbons and Rammsayer (1999) may be suggestive. They showed
that both the P scale and the Disinhibition subscale (from Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking
scale) were associated with LI. For subjects in the preexposed condition of their LI task, high
scorers on these scales showed significantly greater learning, relative to low scorers. The
corresponding correlations for subjects in the non-preexposed control condition were not
significant. Importantly, regression analyses showed that both P and Disinhibition explained
significant independent portions of the variance in the learning performance of subjects in
the preexposed condition. This result encourages the view -- possibility (i) above -- that
correlated personality traits may be independently associated with LI performance. Perhaps
the association between LI and P, independent of Disinhibition, reflected an influence of
schizotypal personality factors (indirectly assessed by the P scale), while the association
between LI and Disinhibition, independent of P, reflected the influence of ImpASS traits.
Clarification of this issue must await further data, but should be pursued in parallel with
studies which try to establish more clearly the nature of the psychological processes (such as
salience) that might underlie personality-learning associations across a range of tasks.
Summary
In this chapter we have considered Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory’s proposal that
certain personality traits reflect variations across people in the sensitivity of the Behavioural
Activation System (BAS), which processes positive reinforcing stimuli. We have suggested
that such BAS-related traits may depend on dopaminergic neurotransmission, but have as yet
come to no firm conclusion about the precise nature of the traits involved. There is evidence
to suggest that both extraversion and impulsive antisocial sensation seeking may be linked to
functioning of the brain’s dopamine systems, and, on this basis, either type of trait plausibly
relates to BAS functioning.
We reviewed the published evidence testing the predicted relationship between putative
BAS-related traits and learning performance under positive reinforcement conditions. We
concluded that the evidence in support of the theory was scant, and found that promising
significant effects were usually either unreliable, were less consistent with the theory than
they first appeared, were contradicted by other findings, or were complicated by other,
unpredicted, significant effects. This conclusion is qualified by our view that few studies
have tested the theory adequately. However, some methodologically sound studies (e.g., Ball
and Zuckerman, 1990) have found significant correlations between measures of impulsive
antisocial sensation traits and learning, but these correlations appear to be independent of
positive reinforcement. At the end of the chapter, we briefly considered an alternative
account for these findings in terms of individual differences in processing the (relative)
salience of stimuli and their constituent features.
During this chapter, we also constructed a simple, but biologically-constrained, neural
network model of learning under positive reinforcement. To our great surprise, we found that
it was very difficult to obtain significant correlations between the learning performance of
simulated subjects and the modelled individual differences in the strength of the positive
reinforcement signals that simulated subjects experienced after successful responses during
the task. These simulation findings suggest that, even if RST were true, it might be very
Personality, Dopamine, Reinforcement,  and Learning 145
difficult in real experiments to obtain the correlations between personality and learning
under positive reinforcement that the theory would predict. The fact that the real experiments
have indeed so often failed to yield the predicted correlations may therefore be less
damaging for RST than would otherwise be the case. In future studies we need to ascertain
that performance on the learning tasks used is likely to be affected by individual differences
in reinforcement sensitivity. Only then can we confidently try to establish the personality
dimensions that may be related to such individual differences. Neural network models may
have a role to play in determining our choice of tasks for this future research.
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